This paper examines the effect of the timing of childbirth on capital accumulation and welfare in a simple overlapping generations model, where each agent lives for four periods and works for two periods. We show that delayed childbearing not only reduces population, but also generates fluctuations in the age composition of workers in the labor force. This causes the aggregate saving rate to fluctuate, which leads to cycles in the capital-labor ratio. When all agents delay childbearing, we analytically show that both the capital-labor ratio and the welfare of all agents can fall in the long run, despite the population decline. When a fraction of agents delay childbearing, it has differential welfare effects on agents depending on their positions in the demographic cycles. The effects of lower lifetime fertility and technological progress are also examined.
Introduction
Consider a fall in population induced by a decline in the number of births in the economy, taking as given mortality and migration. It is well known that a lower population growth raises the capital-labor ratio in the Solow-Swan growth model. The same property holds in Diamond's (1965) overlapping generations model, and it enhances welfare as long as the economy is dynamically efficient; i.e., when the interest rate exceeds the population growth rate.
Of course, the declining birth rate can cause welfare problems when the population size has some positive externality, or when social security systems are explicitly considered.
1 Apart from these issues, it has been generally perceived that the population decline is favorable to economic welfare.
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This paper considers an overlapping generations model without external effects or a social security system. Nonetheless, we show that a population decline can worsen the welfare of agents if it is caused by a change in the timing of childbirth or, more specifically, when many people decide to delay childbearing to older ages.
Delayed childbearing has been broadly observed in developed countries. Between 1975 and 2005, the fraction of Japanese children who were born to mothers in their 20s decreased from 75% to 45%, whereas those born to mothers in their 30s increased from 20% to 52%. A similar trend is observed in the United States and advanced European countries (Gustafsson and Kalwij 2006), and also in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Sardon 2006) . Interestingly, as pointed out by Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) , even when the cohort's lifetime fertility rate (the number of children a mother has in her lifetime) does not fall, the delayed childbearing alone leads to a decline in the number of childbirths, measured by the total period fertility rates (TPFRs). Ogawa and Retherford (1993) , Kohler et al. (2002) , and Sobotka (2004) confirmed that, to a certain extent, the delay of marriage and motherhood is 1 To support a pay-as-you-go pension system, the economy must have enough children. For the relationship between endogenous fertility and optimal social security, see Zhang and Zhang (2007) and Yew and Zhang (2009) .
responsible for the observed period fertility rate decline (now known as the "tempo effect").
The seminal studies that incorporated the tempo effect into economic theory are Happel et al. (1984) and Cigno and Ermisch (1989) . These studies constructed models where women endogenously choose the timing of childbearing considering the fact that childbearing interrupts their work experience for a certain period, which affects their lifetime income profiles through their career paths or the accumulation of human capital. Complementary to these preceding studies, this paper focuses on the aspect that delayed childbearing changes the age structure of the labor force. When a considerable fraction of mothers begin to delay childbearing, it causes a temporary baby bust in the economy, and the echoes of the initial baby bust create long-lasting demographic cycles. We construct an overlapping generations model where agents work for more than one period so that the demographic cycles are translated into fluctuations in the age structure of the labor force.
As the variation in the age composition of workers affects the distribution of income among different cohorts (see Berger 1989) , demographic cycles lead to cycles in the aggregate saving rate, which drive fluctuations in the capital-labor ratio. We will show that the fluctuations in the capital-labor ratio have differential welfare effects on agents depending on their positions in the demographic cycles. This point was not found by earlier studies. For instance, Iyigun Appendices A and B provide the proofs of the lemmas.
Model

Demographic Structure
Let us consider an overlapping generations model where each agent lives for four periods, referred to as child, young, middle-aged, and old. A group of young agents in period t (i.e., those who are born in period t − 1) is called generation t, and its cohort size is denoted by N t . Each agent has one child during her lifetime (the gender of the agents is not considered), and she is able to bear a child either in her youth or middle age. In this paper, we say that an agent "delays childbearing" if she bears her (only) child in her middle age.
Let us denote by λ t ∈ [0, 1] the fraction of agents among generation-t agents who delay childbearing. This means that among the generation-t agents with population N t , the fraction λ t bear their children in their middle age (period t + 1), and the remaining fraction 1 − λ t bear their children in their youth (period t). The cohort size of generation t + 1, born in period t, is thus determined by:
To highlight the effect of age distribution on capital accumulation and welfare as simply as possible, the timing of childbearing is assumed to be exogenous throughout the analysis. We consider the situation where all agents until generation −1 bear their children when they are young, and from generation 0 a constant fraction λ of agents bear their children when they are middle-aged, i.e.:
We normalize the cohort size so that N 0 = 1 holds. As equations (1) and (2) imply that the cohort size is constant until period 0, N t = 1 holds for all t ≤ 0. When delayed childbearing begins, the period fertility rate temporarily falls. In period 0, only fraction 1−λ of generation-0 young agents bear children, while the generation-(−1) middle-aged agents do not bear children because they completed childbearing in the previous period (i.e., λ −1 = 0).
Thus, the cohort size of generation 1, who are born in period 0, is given by:
From period 1 on, not only a fraction 1 − λ of young agents, but also a fraction λ of middle-aged agents bear children. Hence, the period fertility rate recovers to some extent, which is consistent with Bongaarts and Feeney (1998) . Substituting N 0 = 1, N 1 = 1 − λ, and equation (2) into (1), the cohort size after generation 0 is solved as N t = 1 1+λ
for t ≥ 0. Figure 1 cohort size N t fluctuates after delayed childbearing begins (i.e., after period 0), and that the amplitude of oscillation is larger when λ is higher. This indicates that the initial fluctuation of age structure (i.e., the fall in the fertility rate in period 0 and a recovery in period 1) has recurrent "echo effects" over many generations. If λ ∈ (0, 1), the fluctuation decays and N t converges to a stationary level at lim t→∞ N t = 1/(1 + λ), 6 although N t fluctuates forever in the polar case of λ = 1.
Economic Environment
Agents undertake no economic activity in their childhood, supply one unit of labor inelastically in their youth and middle age, respectively, and retire when old. The total labor force in period t is thus expressed as:
which is depicted in Figure 2 for various levels of λ. This figure shows that the delayed childbearing decreases the labor force permanently even when the lifetime fertility rate is held constant, and the level of L t is lower when a larger fraction of agents decide to delay childbearing (i.e., when λ is higher). 7 Observe also that the labor force L t has much smaller oscillations than the cohort size N t (in fact, there is no oscillation when λ = 1). We will show that the fluctuations in the age composition of the labor force, rather than in the size of the labor force itself, drive the economic dynamics in this model.
There is a single final good in each period that can be used for either consumption or investment. Consumption takes place when agents are middle-aged and old. 8 The utility of a generation-t agent is given by:
where c m,t+1 and c o,t+2 represent generation-t consumption in their middle age (period t + 1) and old age (period t + 2), respectively.
Let w t and r t denote the wage rate and the gross interest rate (i.e., including the principal) in period t. Then, the budget constraint of a generation-t agent is:
where a y,t and a m,t+1 denote the amounts of assets held by a generation-t agent when she is young and middle-aged, respectively. Maximizing (5) subject to (6)-(8) yields:
where z ≡ β/(1 + β) denotes the propensity to save by the middle-aged, which is a key parameter in the following analysis.
, the total labor force is expressed as L t = 1 1+λ
for t ≥ 1. In period 0, it is given by 2 − λ. It can be shown analytically that L t is a decreasing function with respect to λ when 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Similarly, the total population, ∑ 2 j=−1 N t−j , also decreases as λ increases. 8 For simplicity, we do not explicitly consider consumption in childhood and youth as the main results are not qualitatively affected. We also ignore the utility from and the costs of having children. See, for example, Tamura (2006) for the fertility decision through utility maximization.
Observe that in period t, aggregate savings consist of the asset holdings of young agents, a y,t N t , and the assets held by the middle-aged, a m,t N t−1 . These aggregate savings, denoted by S t , become the capital stock in the next period. From (6) and (10) , this means that the capital stock in period t + 1, denoted by K t+1 , is determined as:
Goods are produced competitively by a representative firm using labor and the capital stock. The aggregate amount of production is given by a standard Cobb-Douglas production
, where parameter A > 0 is total factor productivity, whereas parameter α ∈ (0, 1) represents the share of capital. The production function can be expressed the profit-maximizing condition for the firm implies that the factor prices in equilibrium are:
Substituting these factor prices into (11) gives the evolution of per-worker capital over generations:
where we used the fact that
Recalling that the timing of childbirth λ t for all t is given by (2), equation (1) 
Dynamic Effects of Delayed Childbearing
In the following, we investigate the dynamic effects of delayed childbearing on capital accumulation and welfare. Throughout this section, we focus on the polar case of λ = 1, where Table 1 describes the implied demographic structure at each point in time. Note that the whole labor force consists only of young workers in even periods, and only of middle-aged workers in odd periods.
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With the path of N t , we can derive the equilibrium path of the capital-labor ratio k t , given the initial k 0 and k −1 values. Substituting N 0 = N −1 = 1 and N 1 = 0 into (14) for 9 Of course, this is an extreme possibility: young and middle-aged workers would coexist if λ ∈ (0, 1).
However, the important point is that the composition of young and middle-aged workers in the labor force fluctuates, which is still true for λ ∈ (0, 1). Observe from the demographic dynamics illustrated by Figure t = 0, we obtain the capital-labor ratio in period 1:
For k 2 and onwards, substituting (14) gives:
This pattern of dynamics can be intuitively interpreted in terms of the aggregate saving rate (adjusted for labor force growth), defined by:
As labor force L t is constant at 1 for all t ≥ 1 (see Figure 2 ), 11 v t simply represents the aggregate saving rate for t ≥ 1.
Using this definition, the first line of equation (16) can be restated as v t = 1 − α. In even periods, young agents are the sole workers, and thus they earn the labor share of output,
At the same time, they are also the sole savers in even periods, and because they save their income entirely, aggregate savings coincide with their income,
Therefore, in even periods, the aggregate saving rate v t is determined by the labor share of the production, 1 − α.
For odd periods, the second line of equation (16) can be restated as
Note that v t−1 in this equation refers to the aggregate saving rate in even periods, which is 1 − α as shown above. By substituting v t−1 = 1 − α into the above equation, it simplifies to
In odd periods (t ≥ 3), the middle-aged are the only workers. In addition, the capital used in odd periods is owned solely by the middle-aged, because they are the only savers in the previous period (when they were young in even periods). Therefore, they earn the entire output Y t . The middle-aged are the sole savers in odd periods, and they save fraction z of 10 Recall also that we have assumed δ = 1 for this section. their income. Therefore, the aggregate saving rate v t coincides with their saving propensity,
z.
To summarize, the aggregate saving rate v t exhibits a two-period cycle after period 2:
Note that either the saving rate in even periods 1 − α, or that in odd periods z, could be larger. On one hand, young workers have a high saving propensity (unity), but they save only out of labor income (w t ). On the other hand, middle-aged workers earn both labor and capital income (w t + r t w t−1 ), but their saving propensity is lower (z < 1).
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Using the values of v t in (18), we can derive the sequence of k t . Note that (17) implies a simple relationship between the aggregate saving rate v t and the evolution of the capitallabor ratio k t :
Taking the logs of (19) and applying this recursively, we obtain:
where (15) , and k 0 (and k −1 ) is given as the initial value. This equilibrium path has the following property.
12 There is no cycle in the knife-edge case of
, where k 0 is a part of the initial condition and k 1 is given by (16) . The level of v 1 is then obtained by
13 From the Family Income and Expenditure Survey for wage-earning households with two or more persons in Japan, we confirmed that the average saving rate (1− the average propensity to consume) tends to fall with the age of the household head, from 32.0% (thirties) to 28.8% (forties) to 25.4% (fifties) and then to 11.3% (sixties) using 2000-2010 data. While some other reports find flat or rising age-saving profiles (even after the retirement age), Jappelli and Modigliani (2005) pointed out that these are because contributions to pension funds (including employers' contribution) are not regarded as savings, and also because pension incomes are treated as income although they should be regarded as dissavings. They estimated the effects of social security on the age-saving profile in Italy, which showed that actual savings are highest when the household head is in his/her late thirties and then falls to zero around age 60.
Proposition 1 (Limit cycles when all agents delay childbearing):
In the equilibrium with λ = 1, {k t } 
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Proof:
As t → ∞, the first term of (20) converges to (1 − α) −1 log A, whereas the third term vanishes because α ∈ (0, 1). When t is even (i.e., when t = 2s for some integer s),
from (18), the second term is expanded as log z + α log(
, where:
is a geometric weighted average of the aggregate saving rate v t . 15 Similarly, when t is odd (i.e., when t = 2s + 1), the second term is expanded as log(
From these, we conclude that the values of k t in even and odd periods, respectively, converge to:
Note that V even (z) < V odd (z) holds if z < 1 − α (Case I), whereas the opposite holds if
14 Although the condition for Case II (z > 1 − α) might seem unlikely to hold, this is only because of the simplifying assumption of complete capital depreciation (δ = 1). In Section 4, we show that a lower δ makes Case II more likely, and it is shown that both cases happen within a reasonable parameter range (see also footnote 24).
(i) Case I:
(odd periods) Proposition 1 states that if all agents from period 0 delay childbearing, the capital-labor ratio k t eventually converges to a two-period limit cycle. This fluctuation is driven not by the size of the labor force (which is constant), but by the age distribution within it, through the fluctuations in the aggregate saving rate v t . Figure 3 illustrates the limit cycles for the two cases, where the two loci are drawn by substituting 1 − α (even periods) and z (odd periods) for v t in the capital accumulation equation (19) . Panel (i) shows that in Case I (z < 1 − α), the aggregate saving rate is higher in even periods, which results in a higher capital stock in odd periods. Conversely, panel (ii) depicts that the higher saving rate in odd periods results in the higher capital stock in even periods in Case II (z > 1 − α).
Effects on Capital Accumulation
As we have seen in Figure 2 , delayed childbearing lowers the labor force permanently. This subsection examines how this affects capital accumulation in the economy by comparing the capital-labor ratio in the limit cycles to the economy without delayed childbearing.
Note that without delayed childbearing (i.e., when λ = 0), N t = 1 holds for all t from (1) and the initial condition N 0 = 1. By substituting N t−1 = N t = N t+1 = 1 and δ = 1 into the capital accumulation equation (14), and rewriting the resulting equation using
, we obtain the evolution of the aggregate saving rate v t for the case of λ = 0. From it, we find that the steady state level of v t is a (positive) solution to a quadratic
which we obtain as:
As (20) holds for any λ, we obtain the steady state capital-labor ratio k * for λ = 0 by substituting (25) into (20):
It is apparent from (23), (24) and (26) To focus on the relevant situation, we assume that the share of capital is not too high:
With this assumption, we can show the following property.
Proof:
Property (i) is immediately confirmed by comparing (21), (22) , and (25) at
The proofs of (ii) and (iii) are given in Appendix A.
As summarized in Table 2 Observe that the lower end of the limit cycle (min{k * odd , k * even }) is always smaller than the steady state level k * in the economy without delayed childbearing (which we call the benchmark economy). In addition, if z is sufficiently small (z < z), the upper end of the limit cycle can also be smaller than k * . This means that the long-term levels of the capitallabor ratio k t in the delayed childbearing economy are always smaller than the steady state capital-labor ratio k * in the benchmark economy. This might seem paradoxical, given that in the delayed childbearing economy, the labor force remains low compared with the benchmark economy (compare λ = 1 to λ = 0 in Figure 2 ). This paradoxical result can be explained by the alternating age composition in the labor force. Recall from (18) that the aggregate saving rate alternates between 1 − α and z. In Case Ia, the saving propensity of the middleaged agents, z ≡ β/(1 + β), is small. Thus, in odd periods, when the labor force is entirely composed of middle-aged agents, the aggregate saving rate v t = z is low. This makes capital per worker in the next period (k * even ) considerably smaller than in the benchmark (k * ), and therefore also the wage rate. As a result, workers in even periods, who are composed of young agents, receive substantially lower incomes than in the benchmark economy. Thus, even though the aggregate saving rate in even periods v t = 1 − α is higher than that in the benchmark economy (v * (z)), the amount of aggregate savings can be lower, which explains the possibility of k * even < k * odd < k * .
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Welfare Effects
We now examine how the cycles in the capital-labor ratio in the delayed childbearing economy affect the welfare of agents. Note that, by substituting (8), (9), and (10) into (5), the utility of generation-t agents (those who are born in period t − 1) is written as:
Let us call those agents born in odd periods and thus young in even periods the "evenperiod generations." In the delayed childbearing economy (λ = 1), the whole population is composed only of the even-period generations (N t = 0 for all odd t). Therefore, the longterm welfare of agents in the limit cycle can be measured by U * even ≡ lim s→+∞ U 2s . Using the limit-cycle values of the capital-labor ratio, we can write long-term welfare with λ = 1 as:
where C is a constant term defined as
. Similarly, long-term welfare in the benchmark economy (λ = 0) can be written as:
Comparing (28) with (29), we have the following property.
Lemma 2 (Difference between U *
even and U * ):
even is lower than U * if and only if Ω(z) < 0, where function Ω(z) is defined by:
(ii) lim z→0 Ω (z) = −∞ and Ω(1 − α) = 0 hold. There exists a value z ∈ (0, 1 − α] such that U * even < U * holds whenever z < z.
As long as the saving propensity of the middle-aged, z ≡ β/(1 + β), is sufficiently small, or equivalently when the agents discount the future significantly (i.e., β is small), the delayed childbearing (λ = 1) causes the long-run welfare of agents to fall compared with the case where delayed childbearing does not occur (λ = 0). This again seems paradoxical, because when the population falls from the initial level, it is usually anticipated that each agent enjoys a higher per-worker capital and hence higher consumption. This does not hold true in this case, similar to the discussion in the previous subsection, because of the fluctuations in the age composition of workers.
Numerical Analysis
This section considers a general case where only a fraction of agents delay childbearing.
When λ ∈ (0, 1), the fluctuations in N t gradually settle to a long-term value (see Figure 1) .
Nonetheless, the fluctuations in N t continue for an extended number of generations, especially when λ is relatively large. 18 This section examines their effects on capital accumulation and welfare in the transitional dynamics. We also relax the assumption of complete capital depreciation.
Equilibrium Dynamics under
For a given value of λ, the path of N t is readily calculated as depicted in Figure 1 using (1) and (2) along with initial condition N 0 = 1. As N t = 1 for all t ≤ 0, we reasonably assume that the economy has reached the steady state under N t = 1 by period −1, and also remains at the same steady state at period 0.
in Subsection 3.2 as the benchmark case, where the steady state level of the capital-labor ratio k * is given by (26) . Thus, we use k −1 = k −0 = k * as the initial condition to calculate the path of k t using (14) .
We specify the parameters as follows. As an agent lives for four periods, one period in the model can be considered as approximately 20 years. If agents discount future consumption by 1% per quarter, as is often assumed in the literature, the discount factor β will be (1 + 0.01) −4×20 ≈ 0.45. Therefore, we take β = 0.45 as the reference value, and also examine the low-beta (β = 0.1) and the high-beta (β = 0.9) cases. For the depreciation parameter δ, Nadiri and Prucha (1996) estimated a yearly depreciation rate for the physical capital stock of 5.9%, and 1.2% for the R&D capital stock. The capital stock K t in our model includes both physical and R&D capital stocks, but these estimates suggest that a good fraction of the aggregate capital stock that remains after 20 years would be R&D capital. Therefore we use a yearly depreciation rate of 2% as a reference (which means δ = 0.33 for a period of 20 years), and also examine the case of a higher depreciation rate of 5% per year (δ = 0.64).
The share of capital α is set to 0.4. . . , 0.9, and 1. In period 1, the labor force falls from 2 to 2 − λ because fraction λ of parents in the previous period decided to delay childbearing, and hence there are only 1 − λ young workers in this period. Note also that the aggregate capital stock is the same as in the initial steady state, because it is determined by the aggregate savings in the previous period. 21 Therefore, the initial response of the capital-labor ratio is always 19 Note that, even though λ t jumps up from 0 to λ > 0 in period 0, the population is not immediately affected, nor is the capital-labor ratio, because the fertility in period 0 determines the amount of labor supplied in period 1 and beyond. 20 As we do not distinguish between physical and human capital, the share of K t , α, should be higher than the conventionally measured share of physical capital. Thus, we choose α = 0.4, although the value of α does not substantially change the pattern of the dynamics. The scaling parameter A is set to 1.5. Under these parameter values, we confirmed that dynamic efficiency r t > 1 is always satisfied at the steady state. Observe from Figure 2 that the labor force falls further in period 2 (except for the case of λ = 1, where L t falls to the bottom only in one period). At the same time, however, the aggregate capital stock is also lower than the initial steady state, because there were fewer young workers in the previous period (N 1 = 1 − λ) who contributed to aggregate savings. Figure 4 shows that the second effect dominates, and the size of the fall in k t at t = 2 is do not depend on the interest rate. If the agents are more risk averse (i.e., if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is lower than unity), the middle-aged agents in period 0 would somewhat increase savings, because they know that the interest rate in period 1 will be lower because of the reduced labor supply, and would want to supplement old-age consumption by saving more. Therefore, the magnitude of the initial fluctuations will be larger than shown in this paper.
larger when λ is larger. In addition, when β is small (i.e., when the saving propensity of the middle-aged z = β/(1 + β) is small), the major portion of the aggregate savings depends on the savings by the young workers. Therefore, with large λ and small β, the fall in aggregate savings in t = 2 is so large that k 2 falls below (or "overshoots") the initial capital-labor ratio k * .
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The pattern of dynamics after period 3 depends both on λ and β. When only a small fraction of parents delay childbearing, the fluctuations in cohort size N t disappear in a relatively short period of time. Therefore, with small λ, k t settles to the steady state value k * relatively quickly, without cycles. If λ is relatively large, two-period cycles in k t are present, which last for many generations. The pattern of the cycles is comparable to the results we obtained in Proposition 2. Figure 4 (i) shows that when β is small, the capitallabor ratio k t is smaller in even periods than in odd periods, which corresponds to Case I (a and b) in Proposition 2. In particular, the values of k t in even periods are far below the steady state value k * , whereas in odd periods they are barely above k * (except for the case of λ = 1, where k t in odd periods is also smaller than k * , as we mentioned in Case Ia in Proposition 2). This asymmetry can be understood in terms of the reason why both k * even and k * odd can be lower than k * when z is small, which we discussed in Subsection 3.2. To show the dependence of the pattern of cycles on parameter values more explicitly, we experimented with 40000 combinations of λ and β by varying each of them from 0.005 to 1.00 in 200 steps, and we repeated this for two values of δ. We calculated the dynamic path of k t for each combination of parameters until period 10, and then classified the result 22 In Figure 4 , it can be observed that k 2 < k * occurs when β = 0.1 and λ ≥ 0.6, and also when β = 0.45 and λ ≥ 0.9. (around 0.4) of agents delay childbearing. When cycles emerge, the capital-labor ratio is higher in odd periods if the discount factor β (or equivalently the propensity to save z) is small, and vice versa. Observe also that the border between Case Ib and Case II bends toward the right as λ increases. Thus, for a given intermediate β, the pattern of cycles can be reversed depending on the fraction of agents who delay childbearing (λ). In addition, comparing panels (i) and (ii) in Figure 5 shows that a higher depreciation rate δ shifts the border to the right. Intuitively, when δ is higher, the gross interest rate falls, which reduces the income of the middle-aged agents. This lowers aggregate savings in odd periods (when the middle-aged workers are the majority in the labor force), and in turn reduces the capital stock in even periods, making Case Ib more likely. 24 Finally, observe that Case Ia is obtained under a reasonable depreciation rate, although it occurs only when β is very small (i.e., when agents discount the future quite significantly) and λ is close to one (i.e., when almost everyone delays childbearing).
Welfare Analysis under λ ∈ (0, 1)
While we examined U t only for even-period generations in Subsection 3.3, here we examine U t for both even-and odd-period generations because λ ∈ (0, 1) implies that N t > 0 for all generations t. By substituting the path of k t into (12) and (13), we obtain factor prices, r t and w t , on the equilibrium path. Then, substituting these into (27) gives the welfare U t for all generations. Similar to Figure 5 , we calculated 80000 paths of U t by varying β, λ, and δ, and classified the pattern of evolution of U t according to when U t is above (or below) the welfare of agents in the initial steady state, U * , as given by (29) . Figure 6 shows that the resulting phase diagrams are basically similar to Figure 5 . Types of income wage at young interest at middle wage at middle interest at old Odd-period generations higher w t higher r t+1 lower w t+1 lower r t+2
Even-period generations lower w t lower r t+1 higher w t+1 higher r t+2 
Even-period generations higher w t higher r t+1 lower w t+1 lower r t+2
It is intuitive that when k t converges monotonically to k * , the welfare of generations U t also converges to the steady state value U * . Therefore, the region of "No cycle" in Figure   5 naturally corresponds to the same region in Figure 6 . The correspondence of the other regions can be understood in terms of the incomes that agents earn throughout their lives.
Consider the case where the combination of β and λ belongs to the "Case Ib" region of Figure 5 . This means that, after the initial response, the capital-labor ratio k t is higher than the steady state value k * in odd periods, whereas k t < k * in even periods. This pattern of movement in k t affects the income profiles of agents differently depending on whether they belong to odd-or even-period generations. The odd-period generations (i.e., those who are young in an odd period t) enjoy high wage incomes in their youth because k t > k * , and also high interest incomes in their middle age because k t+1 < k * . Although they suffer from low wage incomes in their middle age (because k t+1 < k * ) and low interest incomes in their old age (because k t+2 > k * ), the high incomes in the earlier part of their life affect their welfare more significantly because of discounting, and hence U t tends to be higher than the steady state level, U * . On the contrary, as summarized by the bottom row in Table 3 Recall from Figure 2 that even-period generations have larger cohort sizes than oddperiod generations, and the difference is more significant when λ is higher. Therefore, the result in Table 3 suggests that the majority of agents in the economy suffer from welfare loss when the economy lies in Case I (i.e., when β, or equivalently z, is small). This can be viewed as a generalized result of Proposition 3, which has shown that the welfare of all agents falls if z is sufficiently small in the case where only even-period generations exist (λ = 1).
When β and λ belong to "Case II", the effect of delayed childbearing on the incomes of the odd-and even-period generations, respectively, are summarized in Table 4 . In this case, the timing of consumption. We guess that this is one reason why cycles in U t are less evident in this region (see Tables 3 and 4 ). Another slight difference is that there is no "Case Ia" region in Figure 6 (i), while there was a small region of "Case Ia" in Figure 5 U t < U * holds for odd-period generations and U t > U * for even-period generations. This implies that the majority of the population will benefit from delayed childbearing, while those born in-between the big cohorts experience a fall in their lifetime utility.
Extensions and Robustness
Declining Population
Prior to the previous section, we examined the effect of delayed childbearing by assuming that each agent has exactly one child in her lifetime. This is equivalent to assuming that the lifetime fertility rate (LFR) is exactly at the replacement level. However, in most developed countries where delayed childbirth is observed, the lifetime fertility rate is far below the replacement level (with a possible exception of the United States, where the LFR is around the replacement level). This means that the population is declining in the long run, even without delayed childbearing. Here, we briefly examine the effect of delayed childbearing in the economy where each agent has, on average, less than one child in her lifetime.
Suppose that each agent has, on average, n ∈ (0, 1) children in her lifetime, and also that the number of children does not correlate with the timing of childbearing. Recall that the fraction λ t of the generation-t agents delay childbearing. This means that from generation-t agents with population N t , n(1 − λ t )N t children are born in period t (i.e., when parents are young), and nλ t N t children are born in period t + 1 (i.e., when parents are middle-aged).
The cohort size of generation t + 1, born in period t, is thus determined by:
Combining (31) with (2), we obtain the pattern of evolution of N t . As a result, for larger t, the population is actually higher when a larger fraction of agents delay childbearing.
In a similar way to that in Subsection 4.1, substituting the path of N t into (14) gives the equilibrium dynamics for k t , as shown by Figure 7 (ii). When compared with Figure 4 (ii), we observe that, although the pattern of the fluctuations are similar, the long-run capitallabor ratio k t is lower than in the initial steady state, and the difference is larger when λ is higher. Intuitively, delayed childbearing in this economy (with n < 1) raises the long-run rate of population growth, which naturally leads to a lower capital-labor ratio through a capital-dilution effect.
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As the capital-dilution effect has already been well studied, we examine whether there are cycles in the paths of k t and U t after removing this effect. 28 The results are shown in 26 With the initial condition of N 0 = 1 and
for t ≥ 1 can be solved as N t = c 1 σ
given λ, n ∈ (0, 1). As |σ 2 | < |σ 1 | < 1, the evolution of N t in the long run is dominated by the c 1 σ t 1 term, which means that delayed childbearing increases the long-term rate of population growth from n to σ 1 > n. 27 See Blanchet (1988) and Brander and Dowrick (1994) for more discussion on the capital-dilution effect by demographic growth. The pattern of cycles in U t , shown in Figure 6 (ii), generally matches the pattern in k t , although in the upper-right corner we find that the welfare is higher than the long-term level both for the odd-and even-period generations, at least until t = 10. However, note that this gain in welfare exists only after controlling for the capital-dilution effect. The overall effect of delayed childbearing on the capital-labor ratio and welfare is certainly more negative than (n/2)
} , we calculate the long-term levels of k t and U t , which depend on λ because of the capital-dilution effect (see footnote 26). Then, we examine if there are cycles in the paths of k t (and U t ) relative to their respective long-term levels. analyzed in the previous section because of the capital-dilution effect that shifts the entire paths of k t and U t downward.
Technological Progress
To ensure the robustness of the results obtained so far, here we confirm that the inclusion of technological progress does not significantly change the pattern of cycles induced by delayed childbearing. Assume that in every period there is exogenous technological progress that increases labor productivity by a factor of γ > 1. When labor productivity at period 0 is normalized to unity, production per worker can be represented as y t = Aγ t k α t , where
now represents the amount of capital per efficiency unit of labor. Note that the amount of labor income for each worker (not efficiency unit) should be modified from
, whereas the expression for r t is the same as (12) . Then, instead of (14), we obtain the evolution of Figure 9 shows the path of k t in the presence of yearly labor productivity growth of 2%, i.e., when labor productivity is multiplied by γ = 1.49 ≈ (1 + 0.02) 20 in each period. It looks almost the same as the reference case of Figure 4 (ii), but the level of the whole path is lower than the equilibrium without technological progress. This is because technological progress When it is compared with the two panels in Figure 5 , this phase diagram matches more closely the high-depreciation case of Figure 5 (ii), where δ = 0.64 (5% annum), rather than the reference case with the same depreciation rate (δ = 0.33). This result suggests that technological progress affects the pattern of cycles in k t in a similar way to a higher depreciation rate. Note that while technological progress in a given period enhances total output Y t in that period, the amount of remaining capital after depreciation (1 − δ)K t is unaffected because the latter is determined by the savings in the previous period. Therefore, technological progress reduces (1 − δ)K t /Y t , and hence lowers the proportion of income received by the middle-aged agents (who have claims on the remaining capital).
We also examined the pattern of cycles in the utility of generations, U t . Note that, even in the steady state, labor income w t increases by a factor of γ in each period. By substituting
Therefore, after calculating the path of U t for each β and λ by substituting the path of k t into (27), we removed the trend by subtracting (1 + β)(log γ)t from it, and then examined the pattern of the cycles in the detrended path of U t . Figure 10 (ii) shows that the result is similar to Figure 6 (ii). This confirms that the effects of technological progress on the cycles of k t and U t are similar to the effects of a higher depreciation rate.
Concluding Remarks
In This paper attempted to analyze the effects of the age distribution on capital accumulation and economic welfare as intuitively as possible. For this reason, our model treated the timing of childbirth and the number of children as exogenous. However, in analyzing the implications of policies that aim to cope with delayed childbearing and the low fertility rate, it will be necessary to clarify how agents endogenously choose the timing of their childbearing and the number of children. It will also be interesting to investigate the endogenous relationship between delayed childbearing and declining lifetime fertility rate, which in this study we assumed are independent. The exploration of these issues is left for future research.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of property (ii): From (22) and (25), V odd (z) ≤ v * (z) is equivalent to:
Calculating ρ 
Proof of property (iii):
From (21) and (25), V even (z) ≤ v * (z) is equivalent to:
Similarly, when λ = 0, we have k * / (A (k * ) α ) = v * (z). Using this equation, (29) is rewritten as:
Note that, from (23), (24) and (26) 
Proof of property (ii):
Using (21) and (22), (30) is rewritten as:
log v * (z)
As lim z→0 log z = −∞, lim z→0 z log z = 0 and v * (0) = (1 − α)/2, the right-hand side of (38) diverges to minus infinity as z → 0. From Lemma 1(i) and (30), we immediately obtain 
